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SUCCESSIONS AND DONATIONS
Carlos E. Lazarus*
NATURE AND MEANING OF "SUCCESSION"
At Roman law, a succession was regarded as representing
the deceased until the delivery of the effects thereof to his heir.1
This concept, although adopted in Louisiana in the Civil Code of
1808 in which it was provided that "[u]ntil acceptance or renun-
ciation, the inheritance is considered as a fictitious being, repre-
senting in every respect, the deceased who was the owner of the
estate,"2 was nevertheless positively rejected by the redactors
of the Code of 1825 in favor of the French concept of le mort
saisit le vif, whose reasons for so doing are stated as follows:
"By the Roman law and by the Spanish, the transmission of
the succession did not take effect until the acceptance of the heir;
the acceptance had merely a retroactive effect from the death of
the deceased. The heir was also obliged to apply to the judge to
be put into possession, on which subject the Partidas contain a
whole title. Part. 6, tit. 14.
"We have thought it best to adopt the rule which vests the
rights of the heir from the moment of the death of the deceased;
which is also in accordance with the other dispositions of our
Code, which dispense with the necessity of the heirs applying to
the judge for an order to be put into possession, and give him the
right of transmitting to his heirs, the succession acquired by him
even if he dies before he has accepted it."
Accordingly, the redactors adopted the definition of succes-
sion generally accepted by French doctrine, (1) as being the
transmission of the rights and obligations of the deceased to the
heirs; (2) as signifying the estate, rights, and charges which a
person leaves after his death, and (3) as meaning the right by
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. "Since it often falls out that the Inheritance remains for some time
without a Master, either because he who ought to succeed is absent, or that
he deliberates whether he shall accept or renounce the Inheritance, and that
during these Intervals, it may happen that some Right may accrue to the
Succession, or that it may be engaged in new charges, or other affairs, the
said inheritance is therefore considered as holding the place of Master, and
as representing the deceased to whom the Goods did belong." 1 DOMAT, THE
CIVIL LAW IN ITS NATURAL ORDER, tit. 1, § 1 L. 14, at 561 (Strahan transl. 1772).
See also SIETE PARTIDAS 6.6.11, 6.14.1.
2. La. Digest of 1808, art. 74 at 162.
3. 1 LA. LEGAL ARcHIVES, PROJET OF THE CIVIL CODE OF 1825 115 (1939).
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which the heir can take possession of the estate of the deceased,
such as it may be.4 The redactors also expressly provided that
when a person dies, leaving several heirs, each of them becomes
an undivided proprietor of the effects of the succession, for that
part or portion coming to him, such heirs acquiring the in-
heritance immediately after the death of the deceased, by opera-
tion of law, the right of possession which the deceased had being
continued in the person of the heir as if there has been no in-
terruption.5
The old concept, however, was brought back to life again in
Danos v. Waterford Oil Company, in which the question at issue
was whether it was still possible, sixty-eight years after the death
of the de cujus and after all his heirs had taken possession of
their respective shares, to appoint an administrator. The court
observed that it is the "well settled jurisprudence of this state
that at the death of an individual his succession exists as a sepa-
rate, distinct legal entity until terminated by proceedings had
pursuant to administration by an administrator or executor, or
its unqualified acceptance by all the heirs concerned."7
With this proposition the writer cannot agree. Although there
have been similar statements made in prior cases,8 there is no
legislative basis to support the proposition that a succession is a
distinct juridical personality. As a matter of fact, and by defini-
tion, it is a very tangible thing. It consists of the property that
the deceased has left at his death. True it is that sometimes it
must be administered by someone. The Code contemplated that
this administrator would be the heir of the de cujus, who repre-
sented the deceased in every respect; and although under the new
Code of Civil Procedure this duty falls upon the succession rep-
4. LA. CIV. CODs arts. 871, 872, 874.
5. Id. arts. 884, 940-43, 945, 1292. See also 9 AUBRY ET RAu, Dsorr CVm
FRANgmS no 589 (6th ed. 1953).
6. 225 So.2d 708 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969).
7. Id. at 712.
8. See Succession of Martin, 234 La. 566, 100 So.2d 509 (1958). The writer
was only able to trace this statement back to Succession of Levy, 115 La.
377, 383, 39 So. 37, 39 (1905), in which, without citation of any authority, the
supreme court, through Breaux, C.J., states: "A succession is an ideal, a
juridical person, independent from those having an interest therein." Of.
Tulane University of Louisiana v. Board of Assessors, 115 La. 1025, 1028, 40 So.
445, 446 (1905), in which the supreme court, through Provosty, J., distinguishes
the Levy decision, and states: "Our Code leaves no room whatever for doubt
or surmise as to the fact of the property of a deceased person being trans-
mitted directly and immediately to the legal heir ... without any Interme-
diate stage when it would be vested in the succession representative, or in
the legal abstract called 'successful.'" (Emphasis added.)
[Vol. 30
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resentative, it is clear that under our system it is not the succes-
sion, that is, the property, that represents the deceased, but it is
the heir himself who represents both the person and the property
which the deceased had.9
CAPACITY TO RECEIVE
Articles 433, 1470, and 1471 of the Louisiana Civil Code pro-
vide that all persons, whether natural or corporate,10 may receive
by donations inter vivos or mortis causa, except such as the law
expressly declares incapable and that these incapacities are
either absolute or relative. The Civil Code also provides that in
order to receive mortis causa, it suffices if the capacity exists at
the opening of the succession, which, in the case of a natural
person means that the legatee must be at least conceived at such
time,1" and in the case of a corporation, that it must have been
already incorporated at the time of the testator's death.12
In Succession of Quillou,'3 a bequest to the New Orleans
Public Library1 4 was attacked on the grounds that the legatee
9. The concept that the "succession" of a person deceased is a distinct
juridical entity is incompatible with the scheme adopted in the redaction
of the Louisiana Civil Codes of 1825 and 1870. Although under present law it
is unlawful for an heir to take possession or to be in possession of any part
of the things or property comprising the inheritance, the only penalty for
violating this provision is that the heir shall no longer have the right of
renouncing the inheritance and shall make himself personally liable for the
payment of any Inheritance taxes that may be due thereon. LA. R.S. 47:2413
A (1950). What would happen to the tacit acceptance concept? How could the
heir transmit to his own heirs what he has himself Inherited from his an-
cestor without having been sent into possession? How explain the concept
of representation if there is no transmission to the heir until he has actually
been sent into possession? These and other related questions will be the
subject of a note to appear in a subsequent issue of this Review.
10. LA. CIv. CODE art. 433: "Corporations legally established are substituted
for persons ... Hence it follows that they may possess an estate, and . . .
that they are capable of receiving legacies and donations. . . ." Id. art 1470:
"All persons may dispose or receive by donation inter vivos or mortis causa,
except such as the law declares incapable." Id. art. 1471: "The incapacities
are absolute or relative. Absolute incapacities prevent the giving or receiving
indefinitely with regard to all persons .... .
11. Id. arts. 1473, 1482.
12. Carr v. Hart, 220 La. 833, 57 So.2d 739 (1952); Succession of Hardesty,
22 La. Ann. 332 (1870); cf. Succession of Fisher, 235 La. 263, 103 So.2d 276
(1958), involving a bequest to an unincorporated religious body which, under
the foreign law under which it was organized, had the capacity to receive
mortis causa.
13. 221 So.2d 651 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969).
14. The bequest was "I leve [sic] unto the New Orleans Libry [sic] the
residue of my estate .... Id. The questions raised as to the uncertainty of
the residuary legatee were peremptorily dismissed since there was only one
library in the City of New Orleans to which the legacy could have been
made. See LA. Civ. CoDz art. 1712.
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was incapable of receiving mortis causa because it was an unin-
corporated association. The court found that the library was
owned by the City of New Orleans; was an integral part of the
city; and that the board which operated it was an agency of the
city and as such, a part of the municipal corporation, capable of
receiving.16
DONATIONS Inter Vivos-FRMALITIES
A donation inter vivos is a gratuitous contract whereby the
donor divests himself at present and irrevocably of the thing
given, in favor of the donee who accepts it.l6 In order to be valid,
it must be made by an act passed before a notary public and two
witnesses whether the subject matter of the donation be incor-
poreal or corporeal, movable or immovable. 17 Nevertheless, it
may, like any other contract, be made subject to any conditions,
suspensive or resolutory, provided only that such conditions do
not depend solely upon the will of the donor.'8 The Civil Code also
makes provision for an onerous donation in which "the value of
the object given does not manifestly exceed that of the charges
imposed on the donee,"' 9 and for remunerative donations in
which "the value of the services to be recompensed thereby,
being appreciated in money, should be little inferior to that of
gift."20 These donations, the Code states, are not real donations
and in consequence, the rules peculiar to them do not apply.2' It
15. The court states that such agencies as the Library Board of the City
of New Orleans are treated as corporations. The authorities cited in sup-
port of this statement (LA. CONST. art. 14, § 22; Duke of Richmond v. Milne's
Executor, 17 La. 312 (1841); Hiestand v. City of New Orleans, 14 La. Ann.
330 (1859); and Klein v. City of New Orleans, 99 U.S. 149 (1878)) do not seem
to support this proposition. Nevertheless, the City of New Orleans Is certainly
a municipal corporation, and there is judicial authority for the proposition
that it has the capacity and authority to receive for and on behalf of others.
Fink v. Fink, 12 La. Ann. 301 (1857); cf. City of New Orleans v. Hardie, 43
La. Ann. 251, 9 So. 12 (1891).
16. Although article 1467 of the Civil Code defines a donation inter vivos
simply as an "act," it is clear that such an act contains all the elements of
a contract, for it requires the concurrence of the reciprocal consent of the
parties and becomes perfect only upon the donee's acceptance thereof. See
LA. Civ. CODE arts. 1540, 1550.
17. LA. CiV. CODE arts. 1536-1538. An exception to this rule is made in the
case of a donation of corporeal movables, which may be validly given in the
form of a manual gift, that is to say, by the donor's delivery of the thing
given to the donee. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1539.
18. Id. arts. 1527, 1529, 1559.
19. Id. art. 1524.
20. Id. art. 1525.
21. Id. art. 1526. Although there are no Code Napoleon articles corre-
sponding to LA. Civ. CODE arts. 1524-1526, their counterpart Is found in French
doctrine and jurisprudence. Bee 3 TULLIER-DIVERGIER, LE DROIT CIVIL PiRANAIS
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was upon the application of these elementary principles that the
resolution of the cases of Succession of Grigsby v. Hamilton,22
and Succession of Dickens v. Huey, 2 were predicated.
In the Huey case, the plaintiffs sought to annul a purported
sale of a mother's half interest in community property to one of
her daughters as constituting a donation omnium bonorum pro-
hibited by article 1497 of the Civil Code24 and, in the alternative,
as being a donation with a reservation of usufruct, also pro-
hibited by the Code in article 1533.25 The court found that as a
matter of fact, the value of the services already rendered by the
vendee to the vendor were at least equal to, if not greater than,
the value of the property sold. This, in addition to the charge
imposed on the vendee to continue to support the vendor, con-
stituted the transaction a truly onerous contract to which the
ordinary rules of donations did not apply. The question as to the
validity of the reservation of the usufruct by the vendor was not
discussed."
In the Hamilton case, the basic question was whether a sav-
ings certificate purchased by the husband with community funds
in the name of "Mr. or Mrs. Lee J. Grigsby and/or James Hamil-
ton" should be listed as an asset in the successions of the Grigs-
bys ;2 7 or whether it belonged to James Hamilton as the alterna-
tive payee whose claim was predicated on a simple application
contract form, entered into between the payees and the associa-
tion issuing the certificate, in which it was stipulated that the
payees were to be considered as "joint tenants with right of sur-
vivorship." It was further agreed that the certificate was to be
paid to any one or more of the said payees and that the funds
represented thereby were intended as a gift. Hamilton's argu-
ment was that this was a suit on the contract by the terms of
which he had become the owner of the certificate upon the death
nos. 185 et seq. (6th ed. 1846); 3 MARCAD], EXPLICATION DU CODE CIVIL nos. 441
et seq. (7th ed. 1873); 20 DEMOLOMBu, TRAIT DES DONATIONS ENTRE-VIFS nos. 49,
50 (3rd ed. 1878); 12 LAURENT, PRINCIPES DE DR01' CIVIL FRANgAIS nos. 333 et &eq.
(2d ed. 1876).
22. 219 So.2d 832 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969).
23. 216 So.2d 228 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1968).
24. LA. Civ. CODE art. 1497.
25. 1d. art. 1533.
26. Having found that the transaction qualified as a valid datton en
patement, it was evidently unnecessary to discuss the application of IA. Crv.
CODE art. 1533.
27. Mr. Grigsby died on June 26, 1967, and Mrs. Grigsby died on July 16,
1967. Each died testate but without having made any disposition of the sav-
ings certificate.
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of the Grigsbys, relying on LA. R.S. 6:751, authorizing payment
to alternative payees.2 8 The court properly concluded that the
facility of payment provision contained in the statute relied upon
was intended only for the protection of the associations making
such payments, and that no change relative to the laws relating
to donations inter vivos or mortis causa was contemplated. Ac-
cordingly, the court held that as a donation, the contract was
null for lack of form. Of course, although not mentioned by the
court, another reason why the contract in question could not
constitute a donation inter vivos is that neither of the reciprocal
donees had divested themselves irrevocably of the thing given
since, by virtue of the contract, anyone of the payees could ob-
tain the proceeds of the certificate at any time.
TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITIONS-FRMALITIES
The Louisiana Civil Code defines a testament as an act of
last will clothed with certain solemnities whereby the testator
disposes of his property universally, or by universal or particular
title;O and it provides for three principal classes of testaments,
namely, the nuncupative, mystic, and olographic testaments.80
The nuncupative testament, as its name implies, is an open testa-
ment which may be confected either by public or private act,3 1 in
which category one might also include the so-called statutory
will authorized by section 2442 of Title 9 of the Louisiana Revised
Statutes of 1950.82
28. LA. R.S. 6:751 (1950): "When shares have been subscribed for, or
when any certificate of any class or evidence of indebtedness shows the
investment of funds in any association, in the names of two or more persons,
payable to either, or payable to either or some of the survivors, such funds
... may be paid . ... to either of the persons, whether the others are living
or not; and the receipt or acquittance of the person paid is a complete re-
lease and discharge of the association for any payment made, with respect
to any one."
29. LA. Cv. CODE art. 1571.
30. Id. art. 1574. In addition to these, the Civil Code contains specific
rules for testaments made at sea or in the military service. See LA. CIv. CoDE
arts. 1597-1604.
31. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1577.
32. LA. R.S. 9:2442 (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1964, No. 123: "In addi-
tion to the methods provided in the Louisiana Civil Code, a will shall be
valid if in writing (whether typewritten, printed, mimeographed, or written
in any other manner), and signed by the testator in the presence of a notary
public and two witnesses in the following manner:
"(1) In the presence of the notary and both witnesses the testator shall
signify to them the Instrument is his will and shall sign his name on each
separate sheet of the instrument. If, however, the testator declares that he
is not able to sign his name because of some physical Infirmity, express
mention of his declaration and of the cause that hinders him from signing
[Vol. 30
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In order to be valid, all testaments must be in writing8 8 and
must be drawn up in one of the prescribed forms,8 4 otherwise,
they are null. 5 Undoubtedly, the purpose of the legislation in
prescribing the formalities that must be observed in the confec-
tion of testaments is to guard against the imposition of fraud or
deception, 86 and it is clear from the mandatory language of the
legislation that nothing short of strict compliance with the pre-
scribed formalities will satisfy the requirements of the law.87
his name must be made in the act, and he shall then affix his mark on each
separate sheet of the instrument.
"(2) The notary and both witnesses must sign their names at the end
of the will in the presence of the testator and in the presence of each other.
"(3) The foregoing facts shall be evidenced in writing above the signa-
tures of the notary public and witnesses and the testator at the end of the
will. Such declaration may be in the following form or a form substantially
similar thereto: 'Signed on each page (or If not signed by the testator, the
statement of his declaration that he is not able to sign his name and of the
physical cause that hinders him from signing) and declared by testator
above named, in our presence to be his last will and testament, and in the
presence of the testator and each other we have hereunto subscribed our
names on this - day of 19 .'"
33. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 1575, 1576, 1584, 1588; LA. R.S. 9:2442 (1950), as
amended, La. Acts 1964, No. 123.
34. LA. Civ. CODE art. 1590.
35. Id. art. 1595. Though limited by its language to the classes of testa-
ments enumerated in the Civil Code, the rule contained in this article has
been properly extended by the jurisprudence to the statutory will. See Suc-
cession of Nourse, 234 La. 691, 101 So.2d 204 (1958); Succession of Eck, 233
La. 764, 98 So.2d 181 (1957); Succession of Michie, 183 So.2d 436 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1966).
36. Provisions relative to the formalities to be observed in the confection
of testaments ought to be interpreted in conformity with the particular pur-
pose the legislation intended to accomplish. With regard to the nuncupative
will, the evident purpose is to insure that it contain the dispositions that the
testator has actually dictated; with regard to the mystic testament, that there
be no substitution of a false document for that which the testator intended
to present as containing his last wishes; and with regard to the olographic
will, to insure that it was the work of the testator alone. As to the statutory
will, the evident purpose for the formalities required is to prevent the sub-
stitution of the document prepared by, or under the direction of, the testator.
37. LA. Cv. CODE art. 1595. See e.g., Norton v. Comstock, 151 La. 859, 92
So. 363 (1922) (insufficient number of witnesses in nuncupative will by private
signature); Succession of Vidal, 44 La. Ann. 41, 10 So. 414 (1892) (failure of
notary to recite that nuncupative testament by public act had been dictated
and written by him as dictated); Succession of Armant, 43 La. Ann. 310, 9
So. 50 (1891) (olographic will not signed by testator at the end); Miller v.
Schumaker, 42 La. Ann. 398, 7 So. 456 (1890) (failure of notary to declare that
he had written nuncupative will by public act dictated by testator); Vernon v.
Vernon's Heirs, 6 La. Ann. 242 (1851) (nuncupative will by private signature
not read by the testator to the witnesses or by one of the witnesses to the
rest in the presence of testator); LeBlanc v. Baras's Heirs, 16 La. 80 (1840)
(failure to state residence of witnesses in nuncupative will by public act);
Succession of Michie, 183 So.2d 436 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966) (absence of tes-
tator's signature at end of statutory will); Succession of Koerkel, 174 So.2d
213 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965) (insufficiency of date in olographic will); Suc-
cession of Pizani, 146 So.2d 16 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962) (failure to recite that
nuncupative will by public act had been read back to testator).
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The nuncupative will by public act must be dictated by the
testator and written by the notary as it is dictated in the presence
of the necessary number of witnesses, of which express mention
must be made in the will itself.88 Obviously, the requirements
that the will must be dictated, that it must be written as it is
dictated, and that it be read back to the testator, all in the pres-
ence of the witnesses, is designed to minimize the possibility of
fraud or error. Thus, a testament is void if the testator does not
understand the language in which the will was written by the
notary,89 or if one of the witnesses does not understand the lan-
guage in which it is dictated or the language in which it is writ-
ten.4 0 This does not mean, however, that a testament may not
be dictated in a foreign language, provided that the notary and
the witnesses understand the language of the testator. It should
follow, therefore, as was held in Succession of Dauzat,41 that the
dictation of a testament through the instrumentality of an inter-
preter is impossible. And it is clear that the words of article 1578
of the Civil Code requiring that the will be "written by the
notary as it is dictated" mean that the notary must write the
will in the language in which it is dictated, although he need not
reproduce literally the words used by the testator, it being suf-
ficient that he renders the exact sense and substance of his
words.42
38. LA. CiV. Cone art. 1578.
39. In such a case, the testator would have no opportunity to compare
what he has dictated with what was actually written by the notary even
though a translation is read back to him. De Baillon v. Fuseller, 159 La.
1044, 106 So. 559 (1925). See also 10 AUBRY ET RAU, DRorr civWL ANgAlS § 670
at 157-158 (3 CiviL LAw TRANSLATIONS, under auspices of La. St. L. Inst. and
Inst. Civ. L. Studies 1969) (hereinafter cited as 3 CIVIL LAw TRANSLATIONS).
40. Otherwise the witnesses could not verify that what was dictated by
the testator was the same thing the notary wrote and read back to the testa-
tor. Hebert's Heirs v. Hebert's Legatees, 11 La. 361 (1837). See also DEMO-
LOMBE, COURS DE CODE NAPOLUON No. 197 at 196-197 (1876). But cf. 3 CIVxL LAw
TRANSLATIONS § 670 at 150 n.7.
41. 212 So.2d 523 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968). In the Dauzat case, although
the testimony was contradictory, the trial judge concluded that the testatrix
knew French only; that she was unable to speak English, and that in con-
fecting the testament, she used her son, who was the principal legatee, as
an interpreter to translate her wishes into English for the notary.
42. See Succession of Saux, 46 La. Ann. 1423, 1427, 16 So. 364, 366 (1894),
in which the court states: "The pleadings admit that the will shows that it
was dictated by the testator, and written as dictated by the notary; but it is
urged that the language employed by the notary was not that of the testator.
The testimony attempts to show that the testator was not an educated
Frenchman, and did not speak the language in its purity; also, that the no-
tary interrogated the testator. The testimony shows that the testator spoke
French sufficiently well to be clearly understood. If the notary took down
his exact meaning, and clothed it in more elegant language than that used
by the testator, it is certainly no grounds for avoiding the will ......
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The statutory will must be signed by the testator in the
presence of the two witnesses and of the notary public after hav-
ing signified to them that the instrument is indeed his testament.
If the testament is written on more than one page, the testator's
signature must be affixed on every page. If the testator is unable
to sign his name because of some physical infirmity, he must so
declare (in which case he makes his mark instead). Express
mention of his declaration and of the cause that hinders him
must be made in the act of superscription or attestation clause
prepared by the notary; and this clause must also be signed (or
marked) by the testator, and signed by the witnesses and by the
notary, all in the presence of each other.
48
It has been previously observed by this writer that because
of the comparatively few requirements imposed in the making
of a statutory will, it should not be too difficult for a competent
notary to properly observe and comply with them,44 particularly
in view of the permissiveness of the statute regarding the attes-
tation clause.45 Nevertheless, whether the formalities prescribed
have been observed continues to be a source of litigation.
In Succession of Wilson,4 although the signature of the tes-
tator appeared immediately after the dispositive provisions, it
was conspicuously absent following the act of superscription
which was attested only by the notary and the two witnesses.
Since the signature of the testator under the attestation clause is
essential to the validity of the testament under La. R.S. 9:2442
(3), the will was declared invalid.47
43. LA. R.S. 9:2442 (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1964, No. 123. Although
the original statute was susceptible of the construction, and this writer has
always been of the opinion, that the will must be signed by the testator,
by the notary and by the witnesses at the conclusion of the dispositive pro-
visions (cf. Succession of Eck, 233 La. 764, 98 So.2d 181 (1957), in which the
supreme court agrees with the trial judge that the words "end of the will"
signify the place where the dispositive provisions terminate) and that it
must again be signed by them following the act of superscription, the su-
preme court has held that all the statute required was that the signatures of
the testator, of the witnesses and of the notary be affixed in the presence
of each other under the attestation clause. See Succession of Nourse, 234 La.
691, 101 So.2d 204 (1958).
This apparently seems to be the established jurisprudence under the
statute as amended, as evidenced by the recent case of Succession of Chopin,
214 So.2d 248 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968).
44. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1962-1963
Term-Successions d Donations, 24 LA. L. REV., 184, 186 n.7 (1964).
45. The formal requirements for the confection of a statutory will are
mandatory for its validity. Only the form of the attestation clause is per-
missible and subject to any variations provided it is substantially in the
form required. Succession of Michie, 183 So.2d 436 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966).
46. 213 So.2d 776 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1968).
47. Cf. Succession of Eck, 233 La. 764, 98 So.2d 181 (1957).
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In Howard v. Gunter,48 although the will contained a no-
tary's jurat and was also signed by the testator and two witnesses,
the court found the will to be an absolute nullity because the
act of superscription was totally lacking.49
In two other cases, Succession of Babin," and Succession of
Suarez,5 1 the attacks made on the validity of the attestation
clauses were summarily dismissed, the court finding that the
alleged defects were nonexistent.5
A more important question was presented in Succession of
Chopin,55 in which the attack appears to have been levelled, not
at the form of the will, but at the manner in which it was con-
fected. The statute envisions that where the testator is physically
unable to sign his name he must make a declaration to this ef-
fect, and express mention of this must be made in the act of
superscription. The difficulty in this case was that although ex-
press mention of the testator's declaration of his inability to sign
his name was made by the notary in the act of superscription,
no such declaration could have actually been made verbally by
the testatrix because as a result of a stroke she was unable to
speak. Along with the dispositive provisions of the will, however,
there was a written statement to the effect that due to her stroke,
which affected her ability to write, the testatrix made her will
with her mark, in which she also approved the will as written.54
Although expressing grave reservations as to the validity of the
testament, the court holds it valid apparently on the grounds that
the declaration required of the testator in such cases does not
48. 215 So.2d 222 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
49. On the left-hand side of the document appeared the following: "Sworn
to and/ signed in the / presents (sic) of me / notary and / these competant(Ac) / witnesses on this / the 10th day of / June 1953 / L. H. Mizell / No-
tary public." (The slashes indicate the end of each line.) The signatures of
the testator and of the witnesses appear on the right-hand side of the docu-
ment opposite the above-quoted jurat.
50. 215 So.2d 649 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968).
51. 219 So.2d 1 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969).
52. In the Babin case, the alleged defect was that the attestation clause
failed to state that the will was signed on each page (a self-evident fact in
the case). In the Suarez case, the alleged defect was that the signature of
the testator was not above, but slightly on the same level and to the rignt
of the signature of one of the witnesses.
53. 214 So.2d 248 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968).
54. Id. at 250: "Since I have had a stroke, which has affected my ability
to write, I have to make my will with a mark, although I certify that I have
read all of the above and It is as I have desired it to be. (sgd) X
Mrs. Lawrence M. Chopin."
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have to be a verbal declaration if it can be established that the
declaration was made in some other manner.55
RIGHT TO CONTEST VALIDITY OF TESTAMENT
In Succession of Wilson, 5 6 the husband of the deceased
brought an action to revoke the proceedings in which his wife's
will had been admitted to probate on the grounds that the testa-
ment had not been executed in the form provided by law.5T The
defendants (the legatees and the executor under the will) ques-
tioned the "right or cause of [the plaintiff] to attack the will in-
asmuch as he failed to establish that decedent left no collateral
relations with a prior right to inherit in the absence of a will."''
From a judgment declaring the will valid, the plaintiff appealed
and on appeal, the right of the plaintiff to attack the will of the
deceased was again urged "in an exception of no cause or right
of action."'5 9 Although holding the exception to be without merit,
the court pointed out that the plaintiff, in asserting his right to
55. At one point in the opinion the court states: "We of course realize
that a declaration in the sense employed here does not need to be of neces-
sity a verbal statement. Intent of a testator whose ability to speak is seri-
ously impaired can only be indicated by a sign, or a gesture, such as a nod,
a grunt, a series of eye movements or the like as was done by the testatrix
in this case. Of necessity this must suffice where the mental capacity is evi-
dent .. " Id. at 253. Then again, the court indicates that the testimony
of the notary alone was Insufficient to warrant a finding that the dispositions
in the will were in accordance with the wishes of the testatrix and that:
"If we had before us only the testimony of the notary we would have grave
reservations about the validity of the will." Id. at 253. But then, the court
concludes: "In the final analysis we must emphasize that the document
clearly stated that it was her last will and testament, it was unequivocal in
its dispositive conditions, and it was, as such, signed by the decedent. Thus
as we have decided that Mrs. Chopin had the requisite testamentary capacity
when she signed the will, we can only conclude that it contained her wishes
... and accurately reflected the manner in which it was prepared, including
the statement concerning the declaration of testatrix's inability to sign
....'" Id. at 254 (emphasis added). Cf. Condon v. McCormick, 134 So.2d 619
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1961), in which a nuncupative will under private signature
was upheld although it was not actually dictated by the testator, but had
been confected by one of the witnesses who elicited the necessary information
by interrogating the testator who would nod his head in assent to the ques-
tions propounded.
In view of the fact that the statute does not indicate the manner in
which the testator's declaration must be made, the writer is inclined to sub-
scribe to the proposition that in exceptional circumstances, such as were
presented in the Chopin case, the testator's declaration may be expressed in
writing, as was done in that case. Cf. critique of Condon v. McCormick in
The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1961-1962 Term--cces-
sions, 23 LA. L. REV. 239, 266, 270 (1963).
56. 213 So.2d 776 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1968).
57. This attack was predicated on the insufficiency of the attestation
clause. Id. at 777.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 778.
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inherit from the deceased wife, had alleged and it was established
by the record, that the deceased had left neither ascendants nor
descendants; that he had also alleged that the deceased had left
no surviving collateral relations; but that no proof of this ap-
peared in the record; and that this last allegation had been denied
by the proponents of the will.
The writer has difficulty with several aspects of this decision.
First, there is no indication whatever whether the plaintiff was
claiming as a legal heir under article 915 of the Louisiana Civil
Code, or as an irregular heir under the provisions of article 924;60
the court assimilates the husband to a collateral relation of the
deceased wife and then proceeds to say that while the plaintiff
in such a case must establish the prior death of the ascendants
of the de cujus, no burden rested upon him to show that the de-
ceased had died without issue or without other collaterals, these
being negative allegations not required to be proved.6' Finally
the court concluded:
60. Under IA. Civ. CODS art. 915, the surviving spouse is entitled to in-
herit, as if he were a legal heir, the undisposed share of the deceased in the
community of acquets formerly existing between them if the deceased died
without descendants and without a father and mother or either. Thus, In
asserting rights of heirship under this article, the plaintiff is required to
allege and prove, not only the death of the de cujus, but also that there were
no surviving parents or children of the deceased. Under LA. CIV. CODS art.
924 the surviving husband Is entitled to Inherit from his wife only as an
irregular heir and to the exclusion only of the state. Thus he must further
allege that the deceased spouse left no lawful collaterals nor children duly
acknowledged by her.
61. "While It may be presumed that one at his death left a father, a
mother, or other ascendants, under the well-recognized fact that everyone
must have had a parent at one time, the rule is that collateral kindred have
only to establish the death of ascendants and there Is no burden resting
upon them to show that the collateral relatives died without issue. Thus,
collateral relations are not required to prove that those from whom they
inherit died intestate, unmarried, and without Issue unless evidence is of-
fered to the contrary." De Gentile v. White Castle Lumber & Shingle Co.,
130 La. 705, 58 So. 517 (1912). Thus, a collateral claiming an estate need only
deny that there are heirs in the descending line. No proof Is required of the
negative. His opponents must show there were such heirs and then the
claimant must establish their death. Hooter's Heirs v. Tippet, 12 Mart.
(O.S,) 390 (La. 1822); Owens v. Mitchell, 5 Mart.(N.S.) 667 (La. 1827); Ber-
nardine v. L'Espinasse, 6 Mart.(N.S.) 94 (La. 1827). Succession of Wilson,
213 So.2d 776, 778 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1968) (emphasis added).
With the exception of the Gentile case, all the other cases cited in sup-
port of the above statement were cases decided under the Code of 1808,
under which the order of succession was different from what It is today.
For example, articles 31 and following at page 152 of that code provided
that collateral heirs of the de cujus, including his brothers and sisters, In-
herited only if the deceased had left no children nor any descendants or
ascendants. Cf. IA. Civ. CODB arts. 903, 904, 911, under which brothers and
sisters of the de cujus concur with his father or mother or both. Further-
more, in the Gentile case, which was a suit for partition in which the de-
fendants filed an exception of non-joinder of parties defendant on the grounds
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"We can conceive of no basis for not applying these
rules in cases where a husband claims by inheritance the
estate of his deceased spouse; otherwise he would be required
to prove the non-existence of collateral relations, a negative
fact, in the absence of a prima facie showing of their exis-
tence.
"The burden was upon the proponents of the will, in
contesting the right of the husband to assert its invalidity,
to, at least, establish prima facie the existence of collateral
relations of the decedent. This burden has not been met."' 2
With regard to the exception itself, it should be noted that
under the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, only three kinds of
exceptions are allowed. The former exception of no right of ac-
tion (that the plaintiff had no interest in the proceedings) and
the former exception of no cause of action (that the plaintiff's
petition failed to state sufficient facts on which to base his de-
mand) are now pleaded through the peremptory exception.6"
However, the consolidation of these exceptions has not changed
the rule that no evidence may be introduced at any time to sup-
port or controvert the objection that the petition of the plaintiff
fails to state a cause of action.6 4
It appears to this writer that the right of the plaintiff to
bring this action depended upon his establishing his heirship as
provided in articles 2821 and following of the Louisiana Code of
Civil Procedure, under which he would have had to allege and
prove, in the manner there provided, not only the facts estab-
lishing the jurisdiction of the court, but also the death of the
de cujus and the absence of others having a prior right to inherit
from the deceased.6 5 It also appears to this writer that if the
exception of "no cause of action" was directed at the sufficiency
that one of the co-owners and co-heirs of the plaintiff was not before the
court, it was held that since it had been shown that the absent co-heir had
died, his interest in the property was presumed to have been inherited by
his parents and by his brothers and sisters, in the absence of proof to the
contrary.
62. Succession of Wilson, 213 So.2d 776, 778 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1968) (em-
phasis added).
63. LA. CODE oF Crv. P. arts. 922, 927.
64. Id. art. 931.
65. Id. art. 2821: "The deceased's domicile at the time of his death, his
ownership of property in this state, and all other facts necessary to establish
the jurisdiction of the court may be evidenced by affidavits.
"The deceased's death, his marriage, and all other facts necessary to
establish the relationship of his heirs may be evidenced either by official
certificates issued by the proper public officer, or by affidavits." (Emphasis
added.)
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of the allegations in support of the invalidity of the will, no evi-
dence should have been permitted.16
The writer submits that the court's pronouncement that col-
lateral relations are not required to prove that those from whom
they inherit died intestate, unmarried and without issue, unless
evidence is offered to the contrary, is erroneous in light of the
new order of succession established in the Louisiana Civil Code
of 1825 and 1870, and in light of the positive requirements of the
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure. It is also erroneous to apply
the rule to a surviving spouse claiming as an heir of the deceased
spouse, although this position apparently has some support in
the old jurisprudence interpreting the order of succession estab-
lished by the Digest of 1808.
REVOCATION OF TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITIONS
The testator may revoke his testament or any of its disposi-
tions either expressly or tacitly.6 7 Although an express revoca-
tion may be made only in a posterior testament containing the
testator's declaration to this effect,"" an implied or tacit revocation
results either from a posterior testament containing dispositions
incompatible with the first or from any inter vivos act implicitly
manifesting the testator's intention to revoke the testament or
any of the dispositions it contains.6 9
Legacies are also subject to revocation and may be revoked
even after the death of the testator for the non-performance of a
condition imposed on the donee or for cause of ingratitude,7 0 in
Id. art. 2822: "The affidavits referred to in Article 2821 shall be executed
by two persons having knowledge of the facts sworn to. These affidavits
shall be filed in the record of the succession proceeding."
Id. art. 2823: "In any case in which evidence by affidavit is permitted
under Article 2821, the court may require further evidence of any fact sworn
to therein by the introduction of evidence as in ordinary cases." (Emphasis
added.)
Id. art. 2824. "No fact which is an issue in a contradictory proceeding
in a succession may be proved by affidavit under Articles 2821 and 2822. In
all such contradictory proceedings, issues of fact shall be determined on the
trial thereof only by evidence introduced as in ordinary cases." (Emphasis
added.)
66. Id. art. 931.
67. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1690, 1691.
68. Id. arts. 1692, 1693.
69. Id. arts. 1693, 1695.
70. Id. art. 1710: "The same rules which, according to the foregoing
provisions of the present title, authorize an action for the revocation of a
donation inter vlvos, are sufficient to ground an action of revocation of tes-
tamentary dispositions. . . ." The causes for which donations inter vivos
may be revoked or dissolved are stated in LA. CiV. CODE art. 1559 and Include:
(1) the ingratitude of the donee, (2) the non-fulfillment of suspensive condi-
tions, and (3) the non-performance of conditions imposed on the donee.
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an action instituted by the heirs of the testator;71 provided that
where the action is founded on a grievous injury to the memory
of the testator, it must be brought within a year of the offense.72
These principles were involved in Succession of Plunkett v.
Lord78 and in Succession of Michel.74 In Michel, the court had no
difficulty in concluding that there had been a tacit revocation of a
legacy by a subsequent codicil incompatible with a prior disposi-
tion.75 In Succession of Plunkett v. Lord, the legal heirs of the tes-
tatrix sought to revoke her testament in which her husband was
named as the sole beneficiary, whom they accused of ingratitude
for having lived openly in concubinage with another woman and
having entered into a bigamous marriage with the said woman
while still married to testatrix, who had been confined to a
mental institution. The sole issue presented, said the court, was
whether the stipulated facts constituted "a grievous injury" to the
memory of the testatrix. The court concluded that, deplorable
as these acts may have been on the part of the testatrix's hus-
band, they reflected only upon his moral conduct, and therefore,
were insufficient as a basis for the action.78
71. See Voinche v. Town of Marksville, 124 La. 712, 50 So. 662 (1909). See
also Thibodeaux v. Comeau, 30 La. Ann. 1119 (1878).
72. LA. CIV. CODH art. 1711.
73. 213 So. 2d 793 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1968).
74. 216 So.2d 597 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968). A tacit revocation also occurred
in Succession of Robinson, 218 So.2d 383 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969), wherein the
testator, after having bequeathed the property to the legatee, subsequently
made an act of donation.
75. In his will, the testator bequeathed to Mrs. Michel the usufruct of a
certain immovable and the naked ownership thereof to several legatees, in-
cluding Mrs. Johnson. In the codicil, he bequeathed the Immovable in ques-
tion exclusively to Mrs. Johnson. Said the court: "In the instant case we are
satisfied that it would be improper to speculate on the question of the testa-
tor's intention. For, although on the one hand he did not expressly revoke
the usufruct provision in the will nor on the other did he restrict the codicil
bequest to only the naked ownership, the codicil provision is clear and ad-
mits of only one interpretation. When the testator said 'I will and bequeath
to Mrs. Mabel Smith Johnson 5037 Daneel & Joseph' he stated In plain and
unequivocal language that he gave the property in its entirety, i.e. by com-
plete and unconditional title to the named legatee .... The codicil dispo-
sition certainly is entirely different from, contradictory to, and incompatible
with the usufruct bequest ... " Succession of Michel, 216 So.2d 597, 599
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1968).
76. "What acts on his part would be sufficient to cause grievous Injury to
decedent's memory is something we are not called upon to decide. Suffice it
to say it would require acts not merely reflecting upon the moral character
of the beneficiary under the will but serious and reprehensible acts directed
toward the memory of the testator." Succession of Plunkett v. Lord, 213
So.2d 793, 795 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1968) (emphasis added).
On the question whether an injury to the memory of the deceased should
constitute grounds for the revocation of donations, see Succession of Mc-
Donald, 154 La. 1, 97 So. 262 (1923), wherein the court discusses the French
doctrine on the subject.
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COLLATION
As defined by article 1227 of the Civil Code, collation is the
"supposed or real return to the mass of the succession" of prop-
erty which an heir has received in advance of his share, "in order
that such property may be divided together with the other
effects of the succession." The obligation to collate, the Code
further states, is based upon the equality which must be ob-
served between the children and lawful descendants of the de-
ceased, and on the presumption that what was given was "so
disposed of in advance of what they might one day expect from
their succession. ' 77 It follows then that donations made in favor
of forced heirs are imputed to the legitime unless they are de-
clared to be made as advantages or extra portions.78 In Succes-
sion of Robinson,79 the de cujus had bequeathed to his daughter
Kathryn a certain tract of land designated as tract No. 5 and to
his granddaughter Mary Belle, issue of a predeceased son, a
certain tract of land designated as tract No. 4. Subsequently,
however, he executed two separate acts of donation inter vivos,
giving tract 4 to Mary Belle, and tract 5 to Kathryn, the effect
of which was, of course, to revoke the testamentary dispositions
he had made of these two tracts,80 expressly declaring that such
donations were intended as extra portions over and above the
legitime of each of the forced heirs. Nevertheless, the executrix,
after having computed the mass of the succession by adding to
the extant property the value of the two tracts of land, computed
the legitime of each heir at $86,913.75 and proposed to impute the
value of tract 4 ($70,000) to Mary Belle's legitime, offering her
a supplement of $16,483.83.81 It was contended on behalf of Mary
Belle, and the court so held, that since the $70,000 tract was
77. Id. art. 1229.
78. Id. art. 1228. As has been previously pointed out, these principles
apply to both legacies and donations inter vivos. As applied to legacies,
article 1228 is clear that the forced heir cannot "claim his legacy" in addition
to his legitime, unless the legacy was intended as an extra portion. Under
the jurisprudence, however, the intention that the legacy is made as an extra
portion is presumed, and therefore, the legacy will be imputed to the dispos-
able portion unless, of course, the testator has expressed a contrary intention.
See Jordan v. Filmore, 167 La. 725, 120 So. 275 (1929). Cf. Succession of
Fertel, 208 La. 614, 23 So.2d 234 (1945); Miller v. Miller, 105 La. 257, 29 So.
802 (1901); Succession of Williams, 184 So.2d 70 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966). See
also Note, 27 LA. L. REv. 448 (1967).
79. 218 So.2d 383 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969).
80. See IA. Crv. CODE art. 1695.
81. Tract No. 5 donated to Kathryn was valued at $74,070, and the value
of tract No. 4, donated to Mary Belle at $70,000, which, when added to the
"adjusted net estate" of $203,858, produced a total, according to the executrix
and accepted by the court, of $847,655. If the value of the two tracts ($144,070)
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given to her as an extra portion, she was entitled to receive it
and keep it in addition to her legitime reserved by law.82
It should be noted that the majority of the court refused to
consider French doctrine and jurisprudence in support of the
position of the executrix on the grounds that there were note-
worthy differences between the articles of the Louisiana Civil
Code and those of the corresponding texts of the French Code.
This was unfortunate, for, as pointed out in the dissenting opinion,
these differences are inconsequential, even though the Louisiana
Civil Code has many articles dealing with collation (as is the
case in many other instances) which have no counterpart in the
French Code. The cases cited from the Court of Cassation, par-
ticularly Aubertot v. Bosonnet,83 merely hold that a donation
made as an extra portion to all the heirs and divided among them
in equal portions is not necessarily imputable to the disposable
portion; nor does it necessarily imply a renunciation by the donor
of his right to subsequently dispose of a portion of the property
not included in that donation. That case also states, that, al-
though given as an extra portion, the donation may well be in-
terpreted as constituting, in the intention of the donor, only a
donation in advance of hereditary shares. This was all that the
executrix was contending should be done with the present legacy,
and there certainly is no quarrel with this as long as there are
Is added to the extant property ($203,858), the total active mass is obviously
$347,928 and not $347,655.
If the total active mass as found by the executrix was $347,655, the dis-
posable portion is clearly $173,827.50, the legitime of each heir being $86,-
913.75. If the value of tract No. 4 is $70,000, which the executrix proposed to
impute to Mary Belle's legitime, then the difference to be paid to her is
clearly $16,913.75, and not $16,483.83, as proposed by the executrix. But these
errors in calculation are inconsequential.
82. The court points out that a simple reading of the pertinent provisions
of the will clearly indicates that it was the testator's intention that Mary
Belle should receive nothing over and above her legitime. When he revoked
the testamentary disposition and gave the tract to her as an extra portion,
it was clear that he Intended her to have it in addition to her legitime re-
served to her by law. Succession of Robinson, 218 So.2d 383 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1969).
83. Cass 9 Dec. 1856, Sir. 57, 1, 444 (sic) [344]; D., 57, 1, 166. It should
be noted that the donations of these two tracts were made to the respective
donees as extra portions, and therefore, it was not beyond the realm of pos-
sibility that the testator intended that they should be imputed to the legi-
time, and not as extra portions, as the French courts have found it possible
to find under certain circumstances. This was all that the executrix was
contending the court should do, and consequently, all the court had to do
was to say that such an interpretation was impossible under the factual
situation presented. To say that French doctrine should not apply because
of inconsequential differences in the articles of the Louisiana and French
Civil Codes is contrary to what has always been the policy of the Louisiana
courts in interpreting our Civil Code.
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sufficient bases to warrant such an interpretation and such a
finding by the court. The trouble here seems to have been that,
in the opinion of the majority, there was no room for any other
interpretation of the testator's intention.
PARTICULAR CONTRACTS
J. Denson Smith*
Although where a sale is made pursuant to an option previ-
ously granted the value of the property in an action of lesion
beyond moiety is to be determined as of the date of the option,'
the four-year prescriptive period begins to run from the date of
the sale.2 These provisions were applied in Fletcher v. Smith.8
The court also held that in determining the value of the property
it is proper to consider its highest and best use as is done in cases
involving expropriation. It reached this conclusion after review-
ing the opinion of the Supreme Court in Armwood v. Kennedy,
4
which stated that the "highest and best use" rule is not appli-
cable to the problem of lesion. The question posed is being con-
sidered for discussion in a later issue of this Review.
An effort by an automobile dealer to claim protection against
the sale of a defective car by virtue of a so-called manufacturer's
warranty plus a signed "check list" which purported to contain
an acceptance of the car as in satisfactory condition and an ac-
knowledgment that future adjustments would be made only under
the terms of the warranty was rejected by the court in Stumpf v.
Metairie Motor Sales, Inc.5 Earlier cases involving this kind of
problem are generally in accord and constitute a recognition that
such limitations of liability are not the result of actual bargaining
and should not be given literal effect. The evidence that the car
was so defective that the buyer would not have bought it if its
true condition had been known to him was clear and convincing.
In Faust v. Pelican Plumbing Supply, Inc.,6 the plaintiff
brought an action in redhibition claiming a return of the pur-
chase price plus expenses against (1) his own vendor, (2) the
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. CIv. CODs art. 2590.
2. Id. art. 2595.
3. 216 So.2d 663 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
4. 231 La. 102, 90 So.2d 793 (1956).
5. 212 So.2d 705 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968).
6. 215 So.2d 373 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968).
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